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#### The aff commodifies the suffering of maquiladoras in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse to engage in the trauma economy

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

## 3

#### State action and institutional ethics makes anti-blackness worse - erases the exploitation of the black body

Wilderson, award-winning author of Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid. He is one of two Americans to hold elected office in the African National Congress and is a former insurgent in the ANC’s armed wing, **20**03 (Frank B. III “Introduction: Unspeakable Ethics” *Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Strucure of U.S.* Antagonisms, Pg 15-16) GG

**Regarding the Black position**, **some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic** **for** cinema, film studies, and **political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves**? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the US as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? **One could answer** these questions **by** **demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the State has come to pass.** In other words, **the election of a Black President aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life**. But such **empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same.** **Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and/or public policy debates** would be the very rubric that I am calling into question**: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it**. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why **work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air**. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way: no slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, **no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews it coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is,** to borrow from Patterson, **generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world.** The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy, but on the one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.

## 2

#### We’ll defend the entirety of the 1AC without the plan text

#### Using the USFG is violent imperialism

Reid-Brinkley ‘8 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008)

So, within public discourse, how race is coded rhetorically in public deliberation is of critical import.

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 118 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### Vote negative to politicize the ballot AGAINST their useless style of simulated politics---we refuse to consent to a methodology that consolidates power in the hands of corporate oligarchy---Shattering the illusion of FIAT and forcing the aff to search for new Models of Debate---they don’t get a perm because we are asking a PRIOR QUESTION

Swyngedouw 8 (Erik, Prof of Social and Political Geography in School of Environment and Developpment at U of Manchester, Where is the political?)

The aim of this contribution is to re-centre political thought again by exploring the views of a series of political philosophers and interlocutors who share the view that ‘the political’ needs urgent attention, particularly in an environment that is sutured by a view of the ‘end of politics’ and the consolidation of a post-political and post-democratic condition. In the first part of the paper, I shall briefly consider the reduction, accelerating rapidly over the past few decades, of the political terrain to a post-democratic arrangement of oligarchic policing. The latter refers to the domination, to the attempted suturing of social space, by an instituted police order in which expert administration (a science/technology-management-policy assemblage), the naturalisation of the political to the management of a presumably inevitable ordering, and the desire for ‘good governance’ by an administrative elite in tandem with an economic oligarchy has occupied and increasingly tries to fill out, to suture, the spatiality of the political. In other words, the space of the political is increasingly colonised and saturated by the spaces of policies. In a second part, I shall attempt to re-centre the political by drawing on the work of a range of political theorists and philosophers who have begun to question this post- political order. Despite significant differences among them, they share a series of common understandings about what constitutes the domain of the political. The theme of the final section will be to consider the contours for reclaiming political democracy. I shall argue that democracy and democratic politics, and the spaces for democratic engagement need to be taken back from the post-political oligarchic constituent police order that has occupied and filled out the spaces of instituted democracy. It is in these political spaces that utopias as concrete political interventions germinate. The sort of utopia that Žižek argues is urgently needed today: “[t]he true utopia is when the situation is so without issue, without a way to resolve it within the coordinates of the possible that out of the pure urge of survival you have to invent a new space. Utopia is not kind of a free imagination; utopia is a matter of innermost urgency. You are forced to imagine it as the only way out, and this is what we need today” (Žižek 2005).

The Post-Political and Post-Democratic Condition “There is a shift form the model of the polis founded on a centre, that is, a public centre or agora, to a new metropolitan spatialisation that is certainly invested in a process of de-politicisation, which results in a strange zone where it is impossible to decide what is private and what is public” (Agamben 2006). Pierre Rosanvallon, in his search for a renewed political democracy, laments the recent obsession with (good) ‘governance’ as the new name of a government that would be sufficient for everyone, that would encompass, suture, the social order. For him, this replaces “politics by widely disseminated techniques of management, leaving room for one sole actor on the scene: international society, uniting under the same banner the champions of the market and the prophets of law” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). These arrangements of ‘good’ governance relate to those who embrace “the development of a new type of civil society that would finally substitute for the world of politics. On this front one finds the naïve representatives of NGOs – leftists who have re-invented themselves as humanitarians – and the executives of multinational corporations, all of whom commune together today in a touching defense of an international civil society. The utopias of the one, alas, are hardly different from the hypocrisies of the others” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). Slavoj Žižek defines such ‘governance’ as post-political arrangements that focus on the administration (policing) of environmental, social, economic or other domains: “The ultimate sign of post-politics in all Western countries”, he argues, “is the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension” (Žižek 2002a: 303). This post-political frame reduces politics to the sphere of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions, one that excludes those who are deemed ‘irresponsible’ (see (Raco 2003);(Baeten 2008);(Swyngedouw 2008a)). It is policy- making set within a given distribution of what is possible and driven by a desire for consent within a context of recognized difference. The stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and disruption or dissent is reduced to the instituted and institutional modalities of governing, the technologies of expert administration and management, to the dispositifs (see (Agamben 2007)) of ‘good governance’: “In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account.” (Žižek 1999b: 198) “The political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them), [is] foreclosed … It is crucial to perceive … the post-political suspension of the political in the reduction of the state to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of the market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (Zizek, 2006: 72).

This post-political condition takes the scandalous proposition of Marx that the state is the executive branch of the capitalist class as literally true: identifying politics with the management of capitalism is no longer a hidden secret behind the appearance of formal democracy; it has become the openly declared basis for democratic legitimacy. Maximizing the enjoyment of the people can only be achieved by declaring the inability or incapacity of the people (as a political name) to arrange or manage themselves the conditions of this maximization. The power of post-political democracy resides, in other words, in the declaration of its impotence to act politically (Rancière 1998: 113). Moreover, any denunciation or any struggle against this tactic of depoliticisation is regarded as going against historical necessity. Once again drawing on a populist and perverted Marxism, those protesting are deemed to go against the grain of history and belong to an outdated social group embracing transcended ideologies. The irony is indeed how depoliticisation is effectuated by a certain return to Marx (Rancière 2005b: 95). The post-political in its instituted democratic form, of course, elevates the ‘scandal of democracy’ to new heights. This ‘scandal’ refers to the democratic promise of the identity of the state with the people, a promise that must, of necessity, annul the constitutive antagonisms that cut through ‘the people’. While the place of power in democracy is structurally vacant (as it is liberated from the god-given location on which pre-modern state power was legitimized – (see (Lefort 1994)), yet is metaphorically filled with ‘the people’ as sovereign, those who occupy the place of power and democracy must suture the social order, contain the inherent antagonisms of the social order by suturing social space; the totality of the social is presented in the body of the state. This impossibility, the rupture of the democratic condition from within, is exactly where Claude Lefort (but see also Hannah Arendt from a slightly different perspective (Ahrendt 1973)) locates the totalitarian kernel of democratic forms (Lefort 1986). Democracy’s dark underbelly resides exactly in how its identification with the people can drive towards a position where the occupation of the place of power identifies with the whole of the people, disavows the constitutive conflicts within the social order and the gap between the place of political and the social ordering of the people. Post-politics is caught in this tension: the disappearance of the political as the space for the enunciation of dissensus (see below) and the suturing of social space by the post-political order harbours authoritarian gestures (see (Swyngedouw 2000), exactly by foreclosing the possibility for the political to emerge.

In sum, post-politics is of necessity a violation of democracy. It requires foreclosing or displacing dissent and manufacturing consent and, therefore, annuls the proper democratic political. Indeed, the tension between the Multiple of the Political and the Singular or the One of Policy (Swyngedouw 2008b) is overlaid by the ‘scandal of democracy’, its impossible core that promises pluralist dissensual arrangements, yet institutes exclusive, singular, consensual practices. Indeed, post-politics refuses politicisation which aims at “more” than the negotiation of interests. A consensual post- politics arises that either eliminates fundamental conflict (usually by invoking the whole of the people – (see (Swyngedouw 2007a) and/or elevates it to Schmittian antithetical ultra-politics (Schmitt 1996). The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement.

Propelled on by a drive towards reflexivity, the need to make decisions on processes with high risk low probability (Beck’s risk society thesis) on the one hand and the injunction to choose in the absence of any grounding or guarantee in truth, transfers administrative powers increasingly to a technocratic-scientific elite who is supposed to know and (cap)able to manage the situation. While difficulties and problems are staged and generally accepted as problematic (such as, for example, climate change, social exclusion, economic competitiveness, and the like), they need to be dealt with through compromise, managerial and technical arrangement, and the production of consensus. Consensus, in a very precise sense, is for Rancière the key condition of post-politics: “Consensus refers to that which is censored … Consensus means that whatever your personal commitments, interests and values may be, you perceive the same things, you give them the same name. But there is no contest on what appears, on what is given in a situation and as a situation. Consensus means that the only point of contest lies on what has to be done as a response to a given situation. Correspondingly, dissensus and disagreement don’t only mean conflict of interests, ideas and so on. They mean that there is a debate on the sensible givens of a situation, a debate on that which you see and feel, on how it can be told and discussed, who is able to name it and argue about it … It is about the visibilities of the places and abilities of the body in those places, about the partition of private and public spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it … Consensus is the dismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world” (Rancière 2003b: §4- 6).

Consensus, as the “the annulment of dissensus” announces the “end of politics” (Rancière 2001: §32). This post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus). However, consensus does not equal peace or absence of fundamental conflict (Rancière 2005a: 8). Indeed, in the absence of real politicization, the only position of real dissent is that of either the traditionalist or the fundamentalist. The only way to deal with them is by sheer violence, by suspending their ‘humanitarian’ and ‘democratic’ rights. The post-political relies on either including all in a consensual pluralist order and on excluding radically those who posit themselves outside the consensus. For the latter, as Agamben (Agamben 2005) argues, the law is suspended; they are literally put outside the law and treated as extremists and terrorists: those who are not with us are irremediably against us, they constitute the enemy. Invoking the Whole/the One of the people, while denying the constitutive antagonisms and splits within the people and that cut through the social order, post-political governance is necessarily exclusive, partial, and predicated upon outlawing those that do not subscribe to the consensual arrangement. That is exactly why for Agamben ‘the Camp’ has become the core figure to identify the condition of our time. In other words, a Schmittian ultra- politics that lurks behind and underneath the post-political consensual order and does not tolerate an outside, that sutures the entire social space by the tyranny of the police (state) and squeezes out the political, pits those who ‘participate’ in the instituted configurations of the consensual post-political order radically against those who are placed outside, like the sans-papiers, political islam, radical environmentalists, communists and alter- globalists, or the otherwise marginalized. The riots in the suburbs of France’s big cities in the fall of 2005 and the police responses to this event were classic violent examples of such urban ultra-politics (see Dikec, 2007). This post-political consensus, therefore, is radically reactionary as it forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental and socio-spatial possibilities and assemblages. There is no contestation over the givens of the situation, over the partition of the sensible, there is only debate over the technologies of management, the arrangements of policing, the configuration of those who already have a stake, whose voice is already recognized as legitimate. Consider, for example, how current climate change policy aims to retro-fit the climate with technological-managerial interventions in order to continue as before, in order to make sure nothing changes fundamentally (see (Swyngedouw 2007a), so that things go on as before! (Dean 2006).

Rancière, Mouffe and Crouch associate the political ‘form’ of this post-political consensus with the emergence of post-democatic institutional configurations: “Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimation of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests … Consensus demoracy is a reasonable agreement between individuals and social groups who have understood that knowing what is possible and negotiating between partners are a way for each party to obtain the optimal share that the objective givens of the situation allow them to hope for and which is preferable to conflict. But for parties to opt for discussion rather than a fight, they must exist as parties who then have to choose between two ways of obrtaining their share …. What consensus thus presupposes is the disappearance of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of society …. It is, in a word, the disappearance of politics” (Rancière 1998: 102) (see also (Mouffe 2005: 29).

This arrangement assumes that “all parties are known and a world in which everything is on show, in which parties are counted with none left over and in which everything can be solved by objectifying problems” (Rancière 1998: 102). There is no excess left over and above that what is instituted. There is indeed a close relationship between the post- political condition and the functioning of the political system. Colin Crouch, Chantalle Mouffe and others insist that this kind of consensual post-politics is paralleled by the rise of a post-democratic institutional configuration ((Crouch 2000, 2004). For Colin Crouch, there is a significant decline of government by the people and for the people. Although the formal configuration of democracy is still intact, there is a proliferating arsenal of new processes that bypass, evacuate or articulate with these formal institutions. I have elsewhere defined constituted post-democracy as embodying new forms of autocratic Governance-Beyond-the-State (Swyngedouw 2005) in which the act of governing is reconfigured on the basis of a stakeholder arrangement of governance in which the traditional state forms (national, regional, or local government) partakes together with experts, NGOs, and other ‘responsible’ partners (see Crouch, 2004) in partitioning the sensible, in organizing the ‘distribution of places and functions’. This is the condition of post-1991 democracy. Not only is the political arena evacuated from radical dissent, critique, and fundamental conflict, but the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, announcing new forms of governmentality, in which traditional disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through disembedded networks of governance. These new glocal forms of ‘governance’, operative at a range of articulated spatial scales, are expressive of the post-political configuration (Mouffe 2005: 103) (Swyngedouw 2007b) (Swyngedouw 2008a).

These arrangements of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ are resolutely put forward as an idealized normative model (see (Le Galès 2002) (Schmitter 2002) that promise to fulfill the conditions of good government “in which the boundary between organisations and public and private sectors has become permeable” (Stoker 1998: 38). They are constituted as presumably horizontally networked associations, and based on interactive relations between independent and interdependent actors that share a high degree of consensus and trust, despite internal conflict and oppositional agendas, within selectively inclusive participatory institutional or organisational settings. They imply a common purpose, joint action, a framework of shared values, continuous interaction and the wish to achieve collective benefits that cannot be gained by acting independently (Stoker 1998) (Rakodi 2003). It is predicated upon a consensual agreement on the existing conditions (the state of the situation) and the main objectives to be achieved. They exhibit an institutional configuration based on the inclusion of private market actors, civil society groups, and parts of the ‘traditional’ state apparatus (Lemke 2002) in which a particular rationality of governing is combined with new technologies, instruments, and tactics of conducting the process of collective rule-setting, implementation, and often including policing as well.. The mobilised technologies of governance revolve around individualisation, reflexive risk-calculation (self-assessment), accountancy rules and accountancy based disciplining, quantification and bench-marking of performance. As Lemke (2002: 50) argues, such arrangements announce “a transformation of politics that restructures the power relations in society. What we observe today is not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities, but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. NGOs), that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a renewed relation between state and civil society actors”.

Politics is hereby reduced to the sphere of policy-making, to the domain of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly (and often imposed) participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions. Consensual policy-making in which the stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and where disruption or dissent is reduced to debates over the institutional modalities of governing and the technologies of expert administration or management, announces the end of politics, annuls dissent from the consultative spaces of policy making and evacuates the proper political from the public sphere. In this post-democratic post-political constitution, adversarial politics (of the left/right variety or of radically divergent struggles over imagining and naming different socio-environmental futures for example) are considered hopelessly out of date. Although disagreement and debate are of course still possible, they operate within an overall model of elite consensus and agreement (Crouch 2004), subordinated to a managerial-technocratic regime (see also (Jörke 2005) (Blühdorn 2006)), sustained by a series of populist tactics. What is at stake then, is the practice of genuine democracy, of a return to the polis, the public space for the encounter and negotiation of disagreement, where those who have no place, are not counted or named, can acquire, or better still, appropriate voice, become part of the police. But before we can consider this, we need to return to the possibilities of ‘thinking the political’.

Thinking the political I situate my argument of what constitutes the political in the interstices between two great, but radically opposed, perspectives that have galvanised much of progressive and leftist energies over the past few years. The first one is Hardt and Negri’s Empire and the immanent force of the multitude whose energies are liberated through the vicissitudes of empire, which in its womb, already harbours and nurtures the free reign of the multitude that will transgress and revolutionise the very disempowering and unequally constituted constellation of Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001). Indeed, as they could claim at the end of their book, there is an unbearable lightness in being communist as the immanent force of the multitude will realise itself through some sort of mythical energetic force. The multitude as political agent, from their perspective, grows out of and supplants Empire as a necessary, teleological, revolutionary gesture; political subjectivity is barred, annulled; the forces of empire will just do the trick. In this sense, the observation that Hardt and Negri have written the Communist Manifesto for the 21st Century is correct; it breathes the same unrelenting belief in the immanence of the multitude as it will emerge from the debris of a transcended imperial order, and a politics of egalibertarian emancipation is already structurally fermenting within the interstices of rhizomatic and decentred imperial reign. Second, and at the other side of the spectre stands, symbolically speaking, John Holloway’s Change the world without taking power (Holloway 2002). For him, radical transformation resides in continuous political activism, the obsessive desire for becoming that supplants the need for being, for spatialisation. His emancipatory politics adheres to the sort of activism that asks the constituent oligarchic polity of state and of economy to change, to take the demands seriously. It is political acting that aims at changing the elites not at their transformation, let alone their replacement in a different constituent order. While the political is an immanent process borne out of the configurations of empire for Negri, it is the obsessive activist, driven by a desire for justice and an analytical toolkit that situates injustices within the contours of the politico-economic and socio-cultural order that holds the promise for radical change for Holloway. Simon Critchley offers an ethico-philosophical foundation for such anarchic ‘politics of resistance’ (Critchley 2007). For Slavoj Žižek, such politics of resistance has de facto accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism, centred on a critique of what is and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities. In a review of this position, Zizek (Žižek 2007) states: “The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’”

In what follows, I shall propose and explore a different foundation of and for the political, one that foregrounds the notion of equality as the foundation for democracy, for égaliberté as an unconditional democratic demand, one that sees the properly political as a procedure that disrupts any given socio-spatial order, one that addresses a ‘wrong’. This ‘wrong’ is a condition in which the axiomatic principle of equality is perverted through the institution of an order that is always necessarily oligarchic. The proper political, therefore, always operates at a certain distance from the state, but is aimed at the transformation of the state (the police). Let me start with considering Jacques Rancière’s conceptualization of politics and the political. For him, the space of the political has become sutured by what he defines as the police (or policy) (Rancière 1998);(Rancière 1995). He explores whether the political can still be thought in an environment in which a post-political consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policy-making’, to managerial consensual governing. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (la police), ‘the political’ (le politique), and ‘politics’ (la politique) (see also (Ricoeur 1965); (Lefort 2000)). The ‘police’ is defined as the existing order of things and constitutes a certain ‘partition of the sensible’ (Rancière 2001: 8): the police refers to “all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions” (Rancière 1994: 173). This partition of the sensible “renders visible who can be part of the common in function of what he does, of the times and the space in which this activity is exercised … This defines the fact of being visible or not in a common space … It is a partitioning of times and spaces, of the visible and the invisible, of voice and noise that defines both the place (location) and the arena of the political as a form of experience” (Rancière 2000a: 13-14). The police refers to both the activities of the state as well as to the ordering of social relations and “… sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (Rancière 1998: 29). Indeed, as Dikec maintains, the police “relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance. Thus, the essence of policing is not repression but distribution – distribution of places, peoples, names, functions, authorities, activities and so on – and the normalization of this distribution” (Dikeç 2007: chapter 2, p. 5). It is a rule governing the appearance of bodies, that configures a set of activities and occupations and arranges the characteristics of the spaces where these activities are organized or distributed (Rancière 1998: 29). The police order is predicated upon saturation, upon suturing social space: “[t]he essence of the police is the principle of saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived by ‘the police’, society is a totality compromised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces” (Rancière 2000c: 124). This drive to suturing is of course never realized. The constitutive antagonisms that rupture society preempt saturation; there will always be a constituted lack or surplus, that what is not accounted for in the symbolic order of the police (Dikeç 2005). It is exactly this lack or excess (the ‘void’ for (Badiou 2006)) that constitutes the possibility of the political.

The political, then, is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding “the part for those who have no-part” (Rancière 2001: 6). The political is the arena in which Ochlos is turned into Demos, where the anarchic noise of the rabble (the part that has no-part) is turned into the recognized voice of the people, the spaces where that what is only registered as noise by the police is turned into voice. In the Nights of Labor, Rancière explores how the workers in 19th century France, through carving out there times and spaces, became the political subject under the name of the proletarian and, through this, claimed their place in the police order (Rancière 1989). Politics is, therefore, always disruptive, it emerges with the “refusal to observe the ‘place’ allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)” (Robson 2005: 5): it is the terrain where the axiomatic principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’; a ‘wrong’ that is always inherent in the oligarchic spaces of an instituted democratic polity. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted; the foundational gesture of democracy is equality. It opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality, a subversion that inheres in the constituted ‘forms’ of democracy and, in an intensified way, in its post- political guise. Rancière is here on the same terrain as Alain Badiou: “[E]quality is not something to be researched or verified but a principle to be upheld” (Hallward 2003a: 228). Emancipatory politics emerge out of a fidelity to the democratic principle of equality; it is the unconditional given of and for democracy. Equality is, consequently, not some sort of utopian longing, but the very condition upon which the democratic political is founded. The truth (in the sense of being true or faithful to something) of democracy is its universalising foundation on equality and the demand for justice, for a just politics. Etienne Balibar (Balibar 1993) names this fusion of equality and liberty ‘égaliberté’, the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç 2001). The very promise of democracy, but which is always scandalously perverted, and therefore necessitates its continuing reclamation, is founded on the universalising and collective process of emancipation as égaliberté. Indeed, freedom and equality can only be conquered: they are never offered, granted or distributed.

The political, therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify inequalities or unfreedoms, exemplified by the demands of many activists and others who are choreographing resistance to the police order, but, in contrast, it is the demand to be counted, named, and recognized as part of the police order. It is the articulation of voice that demands its place in the spaces of the police order: it appears, for example, when undocumented workers shout “we are here, therefore we are from here” and demand their place within the socio-political edifice. These are the evental time-spaces from where a proper political sequence may unfold. The political is about the unconditional enunciation of the right to égaliberté, the right to the polis; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in an oligarchic police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. This is of course what Rancière also refers as the scandal of democracy that maintains a singular presence, yet is radically split into two processes: the oligarchic police process on the one hand and the principle of equality expressed through the process of emanciptation on the other (Rancière 1998). Democratic politics, therefore, are radically anti-utopian; they are not about fighting for a utopian future, but are precisely about bringing into being, spatialising, what is already promised by the very principle upon which the democratic political is constituted, i.e. equality.

If the supervision of places and functions is defined as the ‘police’, “a proper political sequence begins, then, when this supervision is interrupted so as to allow a properly anarchic disruption of function and place, a sweeping de-classification of speech. The democratic voice is the voice of those who reject the prevailing social distribution of roles, who refuse the way a society shares out power and authority”. (Hallward 2003b: 192). The proper political act, Rancière maintains, is the voice of “floating subjects that deregulate all respresentations of places and portions.”(Rancière 1998: 99-100): “In the end everything in politics turns on the distribution of spaces. What are these places? How do they function? Why are they there? Who can occupy them? For me, political action always acts upon the social as the litigious distribution of places and roles. It is always a matter of knowing who is qualified to say what a particular place is and what is done to it.” (Rancière 2003a: 201)

The political arises when the given order of things is questioned; when those whose voice is only recognized as noise by the policy order claim their right to speak, acquire speech, and produce the spatiality that permits and sustains this right. As such, it disrupts the order of being, exposes the constituent antagonisms, voids and excesses that constitute the police order, and tests the principle of equality. The political, therefore, always operates from a certain minimal distance from the State/the police1. Politics proper, then, is the confrontation of the political with the police order, when the principle of equality confronts a wrong instituted through the police order. It appears thus when the police order is dislocated, transgressed, “when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part” (Rancière 1998: 11): “[p]olitics in general … is about the visibilities of places and abilities of the body in these places, about the partition of public and private spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it. All this is what I call the partition of the sensible” (Rancière 2003b: 3). A proper democratic political sequence, therefore, is not one that seeks justice and equality through governmental procedures on the basis of sociologically defined injustices or inequalities, but rather starts from the paradigmatic condition of equality or égaliberté, one that is ‘wronged’ by the police order. Therefore, a proper politics is one that asserts the principle of equality and justice as its original principle, not as a normative goal; democratic politics is, therefore, always disruptive and transformative:

“Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics acts on the police (Rancière 1998: 33) and “… revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière 2006b: 13).

The space of the political is to “disturb this arrangement [the police] by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole” (Rancière 2001), it is a particular that stands for the whole of the community and aspires towards universalisation. The space of the political is therefore always specific, concrete, particular, but stands as the metaphorical condensation of the universal. And of course, politics is about the production of spaces and the recognition of the principle of dissensus as the proper base for politics. As Rancière attests: “[t]he principle function of politics is the configuration of its proper space. It is to disclose the world of its subjects and its operations. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in on” (Rancière 2001: Thesis 8); it occurs when there is a place and a way for the meeting of the police process with the process of equality (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics has, therefore, no foundational place or location: “Politics ‘takes place’ in the space of the police, by rephrasing and restaging social issues, police problems and so on”, it is the disruption of the police order (Rancière 2003c: 7). It can arise anywhere and everywhere. “[S]pace becomes political in that it … becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order. The political, in this account, is signaled by this encounter as a moment of interruption, and not by the mere presence of power relations and competing interests” (Dikeç 2005: 172). The political understood in above terms rejects a naturalization of the political, signals that a political ‘passage à l’acte’ does not rely on expert knowledge and administration (the partition of the sensible), but on a disruption of the field of vision and of the distribution of functions and spaces on the basis of the principle of equality. With Alain Badiou, Rancière shares the view that the political event is rare and unusual; they are far from believing that ‘everything is political’, the clarion call of 1970s style progressive movements. While the political event might arise anywhere and everywhere, the political sequence is unusual, eventual, not predictable, and, above all, disruptive. Politics, i.e. the struggle of those who have no name and no voice to enter the space of the police, the contested borderline zone between the political and the police, is an even rarer moment, when those who are part of the situation but not part of the state of the situation become part of the state.

This view of the political as a space of dissensus, for enunciating difference and for negotiating conflict, stands in sharp contrast to the consolidating consensual ‘post- politics’ of contemporary neo-liberal ‘good’ governance. Of course, it also begs the question as to what to do. How to reclaim the political, as discussed above, from the debris of consensual autocratic post-political post-democracy? Claiming the Democratic Polis

The notion of the political articulated in this paper centers on division, conflict, and polemic (Valentine 2005), accepts the constitutive antagonisms that split ‘the people’, that traverse the myth of the One, the singular, and rejects the myth of an archae-political possibility of an organic, sutured, unfractured community, the possibility of a community one with itself. Therefore, democracy always operates against pacification, acknowledges social disruption, and disturbs the management of consensus and ‘stability’. As Peter Hallward, echoing Rancière and Badiou, argues: “[t]he concern of democracy is not with the formulation of agreement or the preservation of order but with the invention of new and hitherto unauthorised modes of disaggregation, disagreement and disorder” (Hallward 2005: 34-35). A political truth procedure, for Badiou, is initiated when in the name of equality fidelity to an event is declared, a fidelity that, although always particular, aspires to become public, to universalize. It is a wager on the truth of the egalitarian political sequence, unleashed by a declaration of fidelity to the communist hypothesis (Badiou 2008), a truth that can be only verified ex-post. Preferred examples of Badiou and Žižek are Robespierre, Lenin, or Mao in their declaration of fidelity to the procedure of communist truth in the revolutionary event.

Badiou defines ‘le passage à l’acte’ as an intervention in the state of the situation that transforms and transgresses the symbolic orders of the existing condition and marks a shift from the old to a new situation, one that cannot any longer be thought of in terms of the old symbolic framings. Žižek insists that such a political act does not start ‘from the art of the possible, but from the art of the impossible’ (Žižek 1999b). Proper politics is thus about enunciating demands that lie beyond the symbolic order of the police; demands that cannot be symbolized within the frame of reference of the police and, therefore, would necessitate a transformation in and of the police to permit symbolization to occur. Yet, these are demands that are eminently sensible and feasible when the frame of the symbolic order is shifted, when the parallax gap between what is (the constituted symbolic order of the police) and what can be (the reconstituted symbolic order made possible through a shift in vantage points, one that starts from the partisan universalizing principle of equality). This is the actual political process through which those that have no part claim their place within the symbolic edifice of the police, become part of the state of the situation. This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, that require a transformation of socio-physical space and the institution of a radically different partition of the sensible. It is the sort of demands that ‘restructure the entire social space’ (Žižek 1999b: 208), that are impossible to be symbolized within the existing police order. The form of politicization predicated upon universalizing egalibertarian demands cuts directly against the radical politics that characterize so much of the current forms and theorizations of resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming, this approach starts from the suturing attempts of the existing police order and its associated social relations; rather than reveling in the immanence of imperial transformation, an immanence to which there is no outside (à la Hardt and Negri), rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances, alternative practices, and affects (à la Holloway or Critchley), the view explored in this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’ through a political truth procedure that necessitates taking sides (see (Dean 2006: 115). Politics understood as rituals of resistance is, according to Zizek, doomed to fail politically: “Radical political practices itself is conceived as an unending process which can destabilize, displace, and so on, the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it effectively – the ultimate goal of radical politics is ultimately to displace the limit of social exclusions, empowering the excluded agents (sexual and ethnic minorities) by creating marginal spaces in which they can articulate and question their identity” (Žižek 2002b: 101).

The problem with such tactics is not only that they leave the symbolic order intact and at best ‘tickle’ the police order, they are actually conducive to the flows of global capital and can be fully subsumed within it. As Žižek puts it, “these practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement ultimately support what they intend to subvert, since the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are already taken into account, even engendered by the hegemomic form” (Žižek 1999b: 264).

In contrast, as Alain Badiou (Badiou 2005b) argues, a new radical politics requires formulating and enrolling new great fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different egalibertarian socio-environmental or geographical futures. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures, making the new and impossible enter the realm of politics and of democracy on the basis of the very promise of democracy (egaliberty), but which the oligarchic hatred of democracy systematically undermines or disrupts, and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Politics consists in a “series of actions that reconfigure the space where parties, parts, or lack of any parts have been defined (Rancière 1998: 30)” cited in (Dikeç 2005: 181-182)”. Proper egalitarian democracy is “the symbolic institution of the political in the form of the power of those who are not entitled to exercise power – a rupture in the order of legitimacy and domination. It is the paradoxical power of those who do not count: the count of the ‘unaccounted for’” (Rancière 2000c: 124). Dissensus is the proper name of egalitarian politics:

“The notion of dissensus thus means the following: politics is comprised of a surplus of subjects that introduce, within the saturated order of the police, a surplus of objects. These subjects do not have the consistency of coherent social groups united by a common property or a common birth, etc. They exist entirely within the act, and their actions are manifestations of a dissensus; that is, the making contentious of the givens of a particular situation. The subjects of politics make visible that which is not perceivable, that which, under the optics of a given perceptive field, did not possess a raison d’être, that which did not have a name …. This … constitutes the ground for political action: certain subjects that do not count create a common polemical scene where they put into contention the objective status of what is ‘given’ and impose an examination and discussion of those things that were not ‘visible’, that were not accounted for previously” (Rancière 2000c: 124-125)

Therefore, the political act (intervention) proper is “not simply something that works well within the framework of existing relations, but something that changes the very framework that determines how things work …. it changes the very parameters of what is considered ‘possible’ in the existing constellation (emphasis in original)” (Žižek 1999b: 199). The political becomes for Žižek and Rancière the space of litigation (Žižek 1998), the space for those who are not-All, who are uncounted and unnamed, not part of the ‘police’ (symbolic or state) order. A true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or no place.

This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, demands that presupposes or requires a transformation of socio-physical space. Such egalitarian-democratic demands, scandalous in the representation order of the police yet eminently realizable, are like those formulated in the last chapter of the Communist Manifesto (universal and free education, universal and free care for the elderly, universal and equitable voting rights, universal and free health care, collective organization of (produced) natures). When these demands were formulated in 1848, they were scandalous, deeply disruptive and rejected out of hand as impossible by the police order. Yet, four of these five demands were realized in one form or another in most of Western Europe during the 20th century: the passion for the real (Badiou 2007) embodied by these demands fuelled the passage to the act that instituted them. That constitutes, for Badiou or Ranciere, a proper political sequence, and one that can be thought and practiced irrespective of any substantive social theorization – it is the political in itself at work. Of course, the current neo-liberal police order has already substantially eroded these democratic gains while traversing the symbolic order, one that now sees these demands again as scandalous and impossible. These are today among the key arenas where the principle of freedom and equality is perverted and undermined, where the scandal of democracy erupts most violently.

Another example of such political sequence erupted when, in 1981, Solidarnosc’s demands for better working conditions on the Gdansk shipyards translated into the universal demands for political rights against the oligarchic bureaucratic order of state capitalism and their apparatchiks in Poland; when the latter acknowledged the demands of the activists, their police order’s symbolic edifice and constituted order crumbled and revealed the empty locus of power. They launched a proper political sequence that would overturn the symbolic order and the distribution of functions and places associated with it. Or when civil society groups took to the streets of East Germany and demanded different rights, it started a sequence that would transform existing authoritarian state forms. Their subsequent history of course also signaled their accelerated incorporation into a post-political European order as the opened dissensual political space soon closed down again.

It is the sort of demand expressed when illegal and other immigrants in Europe or the US claim that ‘we are here, therefore we are from here’. The illegal immigrant already foreshadows of course the idealized neoliberal subject, the one without political inscription, without papers (and therefore no rights); the illegal immigrant already stands in as the subject neoliberalisation seeks to universalize, the one without papers, homo sacer, and who, consequently, has no other choice than to sell him- or herself to the highest bidder: “Nowadays, when the welfare state is gone, this separation between citizens and non-citizens still remains, but with an additional paradox that non citizens represent the avant-garde within the neo-liberal project, because they are indeed positioned within the labor force market without any kind of social rights or state protection. Thus, if we examine this problem in such a way, the sanspapiers and the erased are the avant-garde form of sociality which would prevail if the neo- liberal concept is to be fully realized, if it would not be important anymore if someone is a citizen or not, if everybody would be defined only according to their position in the labor market and the labor process” (Pupovac and Karamani 2006: 48).

Such new symbolizations through which what is considered to be noise by the police is turned into speech, is where a proper politicization of the spatial should start from, where a possible re-politicization of public civic space resides. These symbolizations should start from the premise that the promise of democracy, political equality, is ‘wronged’ by the oligarchic police order, and where those who are unaccounted for, unnamed, whose fictions are only registered as noise, claim their metaphorical and material space. Reclaiming the democratic polis as the space of dissensus, disagreement, and as the space where places for enunciating the different, for staging the voices of those unheard or unnoticed are constructed, egalibertarian voices that aspire to universalisation, is exactly where a proper democratic politics should reside. And it is exactly these practices that urgently require attention, nurturing, recognition and valorization. They demand their own space; they require the creation of their own material and cultural landscapes, their own emblematic geographies. These are the spaces where the post-political post- democratic consensus is questioned, where the right to égaliberté is asserted, practices of radical democratization experimented with, and democracy conquered; not an instituted formal arrangement that cannot but subvert itself, but one that aims at overtaking and replacing instituted post-political post-democracy.

The status quo is always an option – proving the CP worse does not justify the plan. Logical decision-making is the most portable skill.

And, presumption remains negative—the counterplan is less change and a tie goes to the runner.

## 4

#### Government shutdown won’t happen, but it’ll be close—Obama’s capital is key

Desjardins 9/26 **–** Capitol Hill Reporter for CNN (Analysis: Why a government shutdown (Probably) wont happen, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/politics/analysis-shutdown-chances/?hpt=hp_t2>)

Washington (CNN) -- No science or religion can accurately predict what will happen in Congress.¶ But looking plainly at the political chess board and listening to sources on Capitol Hill, there is plenty of reason to think that a shutdown of the federal government won't happen, at least not next week.¶ Here's why:¶ Politics. And blame. And 1996.¶ "Let's put it this way," Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, told CNN. "I'm not about to shut down the government and have Republicans take the blame for it. It's just that simple."¶ Photos: The last government shutdown¶ Who loses if the government shuts down? Where is GOP's alternative to Obamacare? Bill Clinton on Ted Cruz¶ Bluntly, many Republicans fear they will be blamed for a shutdown, just months before a big congressional election year. This makes them highly motivated to find a way to keep government running. A CNN/ORC poll in mid-September showed 51% of people would hold Republicans in Congress responsible for a shutdown versus 40% for President Barack Obama.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, might already be in this camp. He initially proposed a spending bill that would have avoided a standoff. Conservatives forced him to go to war with a different version fully defunding Obamacare, but Boehner's opening move was an important signal that he wants to sidestep a shutdown.¶ Main Street fed up over Beltway shutdown battle¶ There may be some learned behavior from history here, too. "I saw this movie before, I saw what happened before," said Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, talking about the sting Republicans felt after the shutdowns in 1995 and 1996. "That's what happened the last time we tried this," he concluded.¶ Bottom line: Ideal or not, Congress runs on political currency. And multiple House GOP aides tell CNN that the majority of the Republicans in their conference fear a shutdown would cost them with voters.¶ The next fights¶ Republicans are divided over how far to take the Obamacare battle right now. And GOP leaders also are preparing a second Obamacare fight during the upcoming debt ceiling debate. So, they have the option of dropping the anti-Obamacare push from the shutdown debate now and instead including it in the debt ceiling fight coming up.¶ At the same time, Democrats are eager to get past the shutdown debate so they can move on to the debt ceiling and start to deal with yet another fight: budget cuts slated to hit in January at the latest.¶ The numbers¶ Republicans have 233 members in the House, 16 votes more than a majority. Those 233 are divided over how far to take the Obamacare fight, over whether to ultimately shut down government in the name of defunding the health care law.¶ Facebook users mentioned 'Obamacare' 300,000 times in the U.S. and 360,000 times globally, according to data from the site. Here is a breakdown of those Facebook users.¶ This year, funding measures repeatedly have passed the House of Representatives with a bipartisan coalition. Take a look at the Superstorm Sandy funding vote. Or the last debt ceiling increase. Or the March vote to avoid a government shutdown. Sure, every vote is different. But a bipartisan safety net has magically rolled out during the last funding standoffs.¶ Deadline pressure¶ Something happens in the day or two before a potential shutdown. Whatever the atmosphere and seemingly-firm positioning now, things will ramp up fast if Congress gets closer to a shutdown, especially a shutdown that would go in place during a work week.¶ Workers ask if they will be sent home without pay. Troops (and their families) worry if their paychecks will be delayed. Families may start to cancel vacations. That is the moment when incredible political pressure against a shutdown builds.¶ The deadline itself¶ Finally, we come to a public secret. The government does not necessarily have to shut down at the end of the day on September 30. Yes, at midnight, funding officially runs out for most programs. But if lawmakers are close to a deal, the president can order agencies to keep running for a few hours or perhaps even a day or two for Congress to pass the legislation.¶ CNN Fact Checks: Obamacare¶ This has happened before. Recently.¶ At midnight at the end of April 8, 2011, the funding for most agencies officially ran out. But Democrats and Republicans had struck a funding deal a few hours before, it just had not passed through Congress yet. So the Obama administration told agencies to hold off with any shutdown plans because a spending bill was likely to become law soon. In that case, it waived just a few hours of shutdown, but sources in both parties at the Capitol have confirmed that the president can do this for a longer period if a deal is emerging.¶ Again, Congress works best on deadlines, and the shutdown deadline is not quite as firm as people might think.¶ Why a shutdown (still) might happen¶ All this said, you cannot underestimate the swirling, unpredictable dynamics in Congress at the moment and Republicans' gut-level objections to Obamacare.¶ Once the Senate passes its version of a spending bill, House Republicans are considering attaching another item to it. That could be a one-year delay in the individual insurance mandate in Obamacare, a repeal of a medical device tax, a change in how the government handles congressional employee health plans or possibly something in support of the Keystone pipeline.¶ How this affects you¶ A spending bill with something Republicans want and Democrats don't would set up a late game of chicken between the House, Senate and president. If no one blinks, which is possible, this would lead to a shutdown. It's unclear whether House Republicans will do this. It is also unclear how Democrats would react.¶ But this scenario is the reason there is still a chance a shutdown could happen.

#### The plan causes an inter-branch fight that derails Obama’s agenda

Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 67-69

Raising or Lowering Political Costs by Affecting Presidential Political Capital Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction—particularly congressional opposition—to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that **costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms**. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"—Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur—explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand—yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea." While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. **Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races." Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War.6° In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's **highest second-term domestic priorities**, such as Social Security and immigration reform, **failed** perhaps in large part **because the administration had to expend so much energy** and effort **waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics** of the war in Iraq. When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If **congressional opposition in the military arena stands to** derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena

#### That spills-over to government shutdown and US default—that kills the economy and US credibility

Norm Ornstein, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, **with** devastating consequences for American credibility **and the** international economy. Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. **Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require** the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows ‘9

(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## Trading Life

#### The ballot should prefer the team that avoids the fastest internal link to extinction—their framework is politically disempowering and makes the worst types of impacts more likely

Bostrom 2 (Nick Bostrom, PhD and Professor at Oxford University, March, 2002 [Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol 9] <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>)

Previous sections have argued that the combined probability of the existential risks is very substantial. Although there is still a fairly broad range of differing estimates that responsible thinkers could make, it is nonetheless arguable that because the negative utility of an existential disaster is so enormous, the objective of reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration when acting out of concern for humankind as a whole. It may be useful to adopt the following rule of thumb for moral action; we can call it Maxipok: Maximize the probability of an okay outcome, where an “okay outcome” is any outcome that avoids existential disaster. At best, this is a rule of thumb, a prima facie suggestion, rather than a principle of absolute validity, since there clearly are other moral objectives than preventing terminal global disaster. Its usefulness consists in helping us to get our priorities straight. Moral action is always at risk to diffuse its efficacy on feel-good projects[[24]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn24#_ftn24" \o ") rather on serious work that has the best chance of fixing the worst ills. The cleft between the feel-good projects and what really has the greatest potential for good is likely to be especially great in regard to existential risk. Since the goal is somewhat abstract and since existential risks don’t currently cause suffering in any living creature[[25]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn25#_ftn25" \o "), there is less of a feel-good dividend to be derived from efforts that seek to reduce them. This suggests an offshoot moral project, namely to reshape the popular moral perception so as to give more credit and social approbation to those who devote their time and resources to benefiting humankind via global safety compared to other philanthropies. Maxipok, a kind of satisficing rule, is different from Maximin (“Choose the action that has the best worst-case outcome.”)[[26]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn26#_ftn26" \o "). Since we cannot completely eliminate existential risks (at any moment we could be sent into the dustbin of cosmic history by the advancing front of a vacuum phase transition triggered in a remote galaxy a billion years ago) using maximin in the present context has the consequence that we should choose the act that has the greatest benefits under the assumption of impending extinction. In other words, maximin implies that we should all start partying as if there were no tomorrow. While that option is indisputably attractive, it seems best to acknowledge that there just might be a tomorrow, especially if we play our cards right.

#### Try or die for our framework- util is inevitable

**Green 02** (Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University, Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314)

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

#### Elevating other values over extinction destroys the value to life and makes extinction certain—their representation that they know the absolute truth of the value to life makes it easier to end it

**Schell, 82 (**Jonathan, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, The Fate of the Earth)

For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our species’ unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life’s existence. To do this would be to make of our highest ideals so many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died, but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go on.

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, 2010

(Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet **average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

#### No environmental extinction

Easterbrook 3(Gregg, senior fellow at the New Republic, “We're All Gonna Die!”, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set>=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote *Remembrance of Things Past* while lying in bed.

#### Environment is improving - more growth is key

Lomborg 11

Bjorn Lomborg, directs the Copenhagen Consensus Center and is the author of The Skeptical Environmentalist and Cool It, Newsweek, June 12, 2011, "A Roadmap for the Planet", http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/12/bjorn-lomborg-explains-how-to-save-the-planet.html#

Climate alarmists and campaigning environmentalists argue that the industrialized countries of the world have made sizable withdrawals on nature’s fixed allowance, and unless we change our ways, and soon, we are doomed to an abrupt end. Take the recent proclamation from the United Nations Environment Program, which argued that governments should dramatically cut back on the use of resources. The mantra has become commonplace: our current way of living is selfish and unsustainable. We are wrecking the world. We are gobbling up the last resources. We are cutting down the rainforest. We are polluting the water. We are polluting the air. We are killing plants and animals, destroying the ozone layer, burning the world through our addiction to fossil fuels, and leaving a devastated planet for future generations. In other words, humanity is doomed. It is a compelling story, no doubt. It is also fundamentally wrong, and the consequences are severe. Tragically, exaggerated environmental worries—and the willingness of so many to believe them—could ultimately prevent us from finding smarter ways to actually help our planet and ensure the health of the environment for future generations. Because, our fears notwithstanding, we actually get smarter. Although Westerners were once reliant on whale oil for lighting, we never actually ran out of whales. Why? High demand and rising prices for whale oil spurred a search for and investment in the 19th-century version of alternative energy. First, kerosene from petroleum replaced whale oil. We didn’t run out of kerosene, either: electricity supplanted it because it was a superior way to light our planet. For generations, we have consistently underestimated our capacity for innovation. There was a time when we worried that all of London would be covered with horse manure because of the increasing use of horse-drawn carriages. Thanks to the invention of the car, London has 7 million inhabitants today. Dung disaster averted. In fact, would-be catastrophes have regularly been pushed aside throughout human history, and so often because of innovation and technological development. We never just continue to do the same old thing. We innovate and avoid the anticipated problems. Think of the whales, and then think of the debate over cutting emissions today. Instead of singlemindedly trying to force people to do without carbon-emitting fuels, we must recognize that we won’t make any real progress in cutting CO2 emissions until we can create affordable, efficient alternatives. We are far from that point today: much-hyped technologies such as wind and solar energy remain very expensive and inefficient compared with cheap fossil fuels. Globally, wind provides just 0.3 percent of our energy, and solar a minuscule 0.1 percent. Current technology is so inefficient that, to take just one example, if we were serious about wind power, we would have to blanket most countries with wind turbines to generate enough energy for everybody, and we would still have the massive problem of storage. We don’t know what to do when the wind doesn’t blow. Making the necessary breakthroughs will require mass improvements across many technologies. The sustainable response to global warming, then, is one that sees us get much more serious about investment into alternative-energy research and development. This has a much greater likelihood of leaving future generations at least the same opportunities as we have today. Because what, exactly, is sustainability? Fourteen years ago, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development report “Our Common Future,” chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, provided the most-quoted definition. Sustainable development “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The measure of success, then, is whether or not we give future generations the same opportunities that we have had. This prompts the question: have we lived unsustainably in the past? In fact, by almost any measure, humans have left a legacy of increased opportunity for their descendants. And this is true not just for the rich world but also for developing countries. In the last couple of hundred years we have become much richer than in all previous history. Available production per capita—the amount that an average individual can consume—increased eightfold between 1800 and 2000. In the past six decades, poverty has fallen more than in the previous 500 years. This decade alone, China will by itself lift 200 million individuals out of poverty. While one in every two people in the developing world was poor just 25 years ago, today it is one in four. Although much remains to be done, developing countries have become much more affluent, with a fivefold increase in real per capita income between 1950 and today. But it’s not just about money. The world has generally become a much better educated place, too. Illiteracy in the developing world has fallen from about 75 percent for the people born in the early part of the 1900s to about 12 percent among the young of today. More and more people have gained access to clean water and sanitation, improving health and income. And according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the percentage of undernourished people in the developing world has dropped from more than 50 percent in 1950 to 16 percent today. As humans have become richer and more educated, we have been able to enjoy more leisure time. In most developed countries, where there are available data, yearly working hours have fallen drastically since the end of the 19th century: today we work only about half as much as we did then. Over the last 30 years or so, total free time for men and women has increased, thanks to reductions in workload and housework. Globally, life expectancy today is 69. Compare this with an average life span of 52 in 1960, or of about 30 in 1900. Advances in public health and technological innovation have dramatically lengthened our lives. We have consistently achieved these remarkable developments by focusing on technological innovation and investment designed to create a richer future. And while major challenges remain, the future appears to hold great promise, too. The U.N. estimates that over this century, the planet’s human inhabitants will become 14 times richer and the average person in the developing world a whopping 24 times richer. By the end of the century, the U.N. estimates we will live to be 85 on average, and virtually everyone will read, write, and have access to food, water, and sanitation. That’s not too shabby. Rather than celebrating this amazing progress, many find it distasteful. Instead of acknowledging and learning from it, we bathe ourselves in guilt, fretting about our supposed unsustainable lives. Certainly many argue that while the past may have improved, surely it doesn’t matter for the future, because we are destroying the environment! But not so fast. In recent decades, air quality in wealthy countries has vastly improved. In virtually every developed country, the air is more breathable and the water is more drinkable than they were in 1970. London, renowned for centuries for its infamous smog and severe pollution, today has the cleanest air that it has had since the Middle Ages. Today, some of the most polluted places in the world are the megacities of the developing world, such as Beijing, New Delhi, and Mexico City. But remember what happened in developed countries. Over a period of several hundred years, increasing incomes were matched by increasing pollution. In the 1930s and 1940s, London was more polluted than Beijing, New Delhi, or Mexico City are today. Eventually, with increased affluence, developed countries gradually were better able to afford a cleaner environment. That is happening already today in some of the richest developing countries: air-pollution levels in Mexico City have been dropping precisely because of better technology and more wealth. Though air pollution is by far the most menacing for humans, water quality has similarly been getting better. Forests, too, are regrowing in rich countries, though still being lost in poor places where slash-and-burn is preferable to starvation.

# 2nc

## \*\*\*Baudrillard\*\*\*

## 2nc boggs

#### We will Win this debate on their Boggs Evidence---it concedes that their method is soaked in corporate corruption and that only we access their impacts

Boggs 2k (Carl---“The end of Politics,” literally their evidence)

In this book I reflect on what might appropriately be called "a crisis within the crisis"—the profound deterioration of political discourse and action in the United States over the past two decades or so, in a country that has historically celebrated the virtues of open dialogue, citizenship, democratic participation, and public access to governmental decision making. My core argument is that by the 1990s American society had become more depoliticized. more lacking in the spirit of civic engagement and public obligation, than at any time in recent history, with the vast majority of the population increasingly alienated from a political system that is commonly viewed as corrupt, authoritarian, and simply irrelevant to the most important challenges of our time. This deterioration has occurred, ironically and ominously, at a time when deepening social problems—environmental degradation, the decline of urban life, eroding public services, widespread civic violence, increased threats to privacy-will surely require extensive and creative political intervention. In such a historical context the deterioration of the public sphere has potentially devastating consequences for citizen empowerment and social change, not to mention the more general health of the political domain itself— hence the "crisis within the crisis." Further, the deterioration has taken place during a period of accelerated growth not only of the national economy but of higher education, informational resources, and communications. Sadly, despite the much easier access to educational facilities and technological outlets, most people seem to have lost hope for remedies to social problems within the existing public realm. Theirs is a predictable enough reaction to a badly atrophied political system in which differences between the two major parties are narrower than ever and citizenship is in a spiraling decline—as reflected in lower voter turnout, a collapsing sense of political efficacy among ordinary citizens, and declining knowledge (or concern) about the social and political world.

This epochal triumph of antipolitics is not merely a matter of failed leaders, parlies, or movements, nor simply of flawed structural arrangements, but also mirrors a deeper historical process—one tied to increased corporate colonization of society and economic globalization—that shapes virtually every facet of daily life and political culture. Depoliticization is the more or less inevitable mass response to a system that is designed to marginalize dissent, privatize social relations, and reduce die scope of democratic participation.

While the organizing theme, or leitmotif, of this volume is clearly "politics," my approach is not informed solely by the discipline of political studies or political science—or indeed any other modern field of academic inquiry—since my argument does not follow any specialized mode of discourse. The fragmented, professionalized, and insular character of established scholarly fields (and subfields) has the effect of blocking system analysis of the contemporary impasse; in fact, academic preoccupations more often obfuscate or distort rather than illuminate by chopping up social reality into manageable (and usually quantifiable) disciplinary texts, discourses, and "methods." In most academic fields one finds a growing aversion to "macro," or global concerns thai inevitably possess some historical sweep or cut across often artificial disciplinary boundaries. The arid texts in most areas of political science are especially deficient for the task I have set out to accomplish here (which is ironic, given that political science is ostensibly a "political" discipline that should be abundantly rich in sources and insights for a study dealing with the phenomenon of depoliticization and its enormous consequences). Of course, some works authored by political scientists have proved helpful to this enterprise, but the bulk of the literature is loo imbued with conformist ideology, too restricted in scope and methodology, and too detached from odier fields and discourses to be of significant help. These shortcomings are all the more intellectually disturbing at a time of intensifying economic and technological (as well as political) globalization. In fact, the very definition of politics that informs not only political science but most of the social sciences is far too theoretically narrow and ideologically conservative to allow for the kind of far-reaching critique that I set out lo develop in the present volume.

By invoking "ihc end of politics" in my choice of the title. I do not have in mind any literal demise of the political enterprise—nor anything resembling an "end of ideology" or "end of history\*—but rather a metaphorical reference to the Zeitgeist of antipolitics thai seems to define so much of U.S. society at the turn of the new century. Of course "politics" in the ordinary meaning of the icrm-cncompassing elections, legislative activity, public policy, lobbying, presidential directives, and so on—has by no means disappeared from the landscape, nor has it lost its capacity\* to attract significani media and popular attention. Further.manifestations of citizenship and a participatory culture—a hallmark of political vitality—can surely be observed in various forms of community organizing, grassroots struggles, and social movements that, while generally scattered and isolated, remain important parts of U.S. political and intellectual life. Yet, while politics has not completely vanished from the scene, the once vibrant discourse that focused our attention on such values as citizen participation, the public good, political obligation, social governance, and community—part of an ongoing tradition stretching back to die ancient Creeks—has atrophied beyond recognition. This traditional civic-mindedness has been subverted by an array of overpowering forces, first and foremost by corporate power and the growing impact of economic globalization. Yet, owing to the explosive contradictions of the system and massive social problems on a world scale, the sense of finality that might be associated with a concept like "the end of politics" must be emphatically qualified. Whether the nearly all-consuming process of depoliticization dial will be explored in these pages can be eventually reversed and possibly overturned—that is. whether we can expect a turn toward political revitalization—cannot be fully addressed at this time.

## \*\*\*Fiat K\*\*\*

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#### Fiat has failed– roleplaying simulates a perfect government charged with nostalgic longing – only new styles of debate away from fiat can help us face the reality of modernity

**Lindsey 12** (Dr Jason, PhD from Columbia University and is currently Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at St. Cloud State University, Baudrillard’s Simulated Politics and Debord’s Agents of Detournement, journal of baud studies vol 9 nmbr 3)

I. Introduction

 For the political scientist, Baudrillard's work on simulation and the hyperreal is prescient. Politics in contemporary times seems very hollow when compared to the past. In democratic political systems debates on policy have given way to increasingly baroque ideological arguments. The "issues" that resonate the most with voters are generally symbolic or cultural disputes disconnected from economic management or social welfare. Scholarly evidence for this trend continues to accumulate. A good example is the work Lau and Heldman (2009) which builds on earlier research by Lau in (Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980). From this perspective politics, at least in the most developed countries, increasingly resembles Baudrillard's interaction of simulacra.

Before his death, Baudrillard frequently pointed out the ironies of contemporary politics. Consider his statement about the French vote on the EU’s Constitutional treaty in 2005: “The vote is fixed. If the ‘no’ side wins the day this time, they will make us vote again (as in Denmark and Ireland) until the ‘yes’ wins. We may as well vote yes right now” (Baudrillard, 2006). Here there is the sense that this is not what politics and a referendum are, but this is what they have come to be. In most of our political systems we see similar hints that something is not the way it was. What are the tangible differences between left and right wing administrations? Would a left or right government in France handle the EU differently? In the United States, Presidents as vastly different as Obama and Bush dealt with the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath with a continuity of policies. So when we vote, what are we doing? What are the actual options we are choosing between?

Baudrillard’s perspective fits well with a growing commentary on the emptiness at the heart of contemporary politics. Zizek in his recent (2008) writing on violence points to the curious demands of young rioters in Paris’ banlieus in October 2005. That is, they did not seem to have any demands beyond the spasm of violence in which they engaged. A similar incoherence can be observed at anti globalization protests. People are angry and want to do something about it. However, they seem unable to coherently explain what it is that has them so angry. The spasms of violence that break out on the periphery of any large protest nowadays also points to a frustration with current politics. Most recently, we have seen the Occupy Wall Street protests successfully capture the attention of a very large audience. However, these protests failed to articulate a coherent political program. In his visit to the group camped out in New York, Zizek pointed out this shortcoming when he was invited to speak. As he put it, “We know what we do not want. But what do we want?” (Zizek, 2011).

If there are no substantive policy differences between parties anymore, then, as Baudrillard would expect, we have to invent some. Witness the entire pop culture industry in the United States devoted to the mythology of Conservatives and Liberals. This industry now embraces books, television, radio, and the Internet, as well as satirical greeting cards in either flavor. Here again is the sense that these examples are not real politics. Instead, we have cultural products that seem to be the very definition of Baudrillard’s simulacra. But how do we know this?

If all politics is just being played out within the hyperreal, that is, politics are just combinations of signs and simulacra, then why do we have a sense that this is not “real” politics? Why do referendums seem so empty to us? Why are we able to organize protests, but then have the sense that we failed to define a “real” concrete program? Furthermore are signs and simulacra powerful enough to inspire individuals to the point of political violence? Baudrillard would most likely argue that violence on the periphery of politics is not inspired by the interaction of simulacra. Instead, this violence represents a frustration and impatience with politics. For Baudrillard, the possibility of a contemporary, active politics is very slim. Thus, we should expect to see indifference or frustration. However, if that is the case, then how do we explain the motivation of some individuals for engaging in this empty politics to the point of extremism?

To explain this tension, we should examine evidence of a politics capable of referencing something outside of other simulacra. A good pressure point for such an analysis is contemporary use of the modern political tactic of detournement as described by Debord and the situationists. Despite evidence for Baudrillard’s analysis of politics as simulation, the modern political tactic of detournement is still effective. If this is the case, then how can this be explained within Baudrillard’s larger analysis of our contemporary situation?

II. Simulations and Detournement

Recently, a colleague expressed some frustration to me when trying to talk to his students about Che Guevera. Although the students recognized his image, they had no clear idea who Che was. As Baudrillard and others would expect, they knew the image of Che from our consumer culture, but could not articulate who he was. Yet, they still knew his image was associated with subversive activities and radical politics.

This sort of incident illustrates an important point about images; they are double edged. Since the image can be disconnected from its initial context, we have the possibility of DeBord and the Situationists' detournement. We can recycle and re cut the image (like the "culture jamming" of the Ad Busters) to create new messages [culture-jamming] that are communicable through the cultural terrain (see www.adbusters.org). On the other hand, given Baudrillard’s description of our contemporary situation, how plausible is detournement since images are indeed detached? More concretely, how far removed can a given image be before it has lost both its "official" meaning and its reprogrammed "subversive" one? Does this problem indicate that we must consider the timing of detournement activities? Must we create the subversive use of the image while there is still a consciousness of the image's original intent?

Furthermore, if there is an element of timing necessary for detournement, then we must consider the following sort of analysis. Why are some images more deeply ingrained with their initial intent? In turn, such deeper images may retain a possible subversive or detournement meaning for a longer period as well. If some images can be used for a longer period, then does this challenge Baudrillard's assertions that there is no meaning left beyond simulation? If there is no meaning behind the image, then why are some still useable in both "official" and "subversive" modes for a much longer period than others?

Does the possibility of detournement mean that there is some truth to our sense of contemporary politics being a simulation of "real politics”? The ability of detournement to expose the real meaning behind advertising and other public statements suggests that we still possess an ability to understand the authentic when we see it. How else can one explain detournement's continuing effectiveness?

Baudrillard indicates in his work Simulations that this is the wrong question to ask. According to Baudrillard: "We are witnessing the end of perspective and panoptic space (which remains a moral hypothesis bound up with every classical analysis of the 'objective' essence of power), and hence the very abolition of the spectacular” (Baudrillard, 1983:54). Thus, Baudrillard thought that we had already entered (in the 1980's) a period later than the society of the spectacle that Debord describes in the 1960's. The idea of any remaining ground or foundation from which one could engage in Debord's neo Marxist analysis has already disappeared according to Baudrillard.

From this perspective, there is no relationship or channel of manipulation to unmask. The relationship between media and us (the audience) has collapsed to the point that Baudrillard sees no space between the two. In, Simulations, Baudrillard speaks explicitly about television (Ibid.:55-58). Already in 1983 he is concerned that reality television meant that there was no longer a subject with perspective. So, to Baudrillard, Debord's analysis is already obsolete because we are no longer an audience to a spectacle but instead we are a part of simulation. Thus for Baudrillard, the real has been replaced by the hyperreal.

However, if Baudrillard is correct, then shouldn't detournement become ineffective? If the distance needed for a relationship like Debord's spectacle has collapsed, then how could the dialectic of recuperation and detournement still be possible? For Baudrillard the answer would appear to be that Debord's concept is impossible. Anything that appears to us now as detournement is most likely a simulation of that process. Recuperation and detournement are collapsed categories just like every other possible anchor in the hyperreal. Indeed, Baudrillard seems borne out to some extent when we consider the efforts of companies and products to establish "street cred". These efforts range from advertising that engages in self-parody to the planting of grass roots reviews on websites. Thus, the idea of detournement, or perhaps we should say authentic, non-simulated detournement seems obsolete.

Debord himself indicates that detournement relies on some sort of ground or context. Hence, his second law of detournement, "The distortions introduced in the detourned elements must be as simplified as possible, since the main impact of detournement is directly related to the conscious or semiconscious recollection of the original contexts of the elements" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). If Baudrillard is correct in his description of the hyperreal, then it is hard to see how this original context can survive.

Yet, despite Baudrillard's criticism, there is evidence of Debord's dialectic functioning in contemporary culture. Writing in the late 1950's, Debord and Wolman argued that a growth in detournement would become visible in the arts through, "an increasingly extensive transformation of phrases or plastic works that happen to be in fashion" (Ibid.:3). This observation triggers several associations with contemporary culture such as the pervasive sampling that makes up current music, books that stitch together different cultural worlds, (such as Pride and Prejudice and Zombies) or television sitcoms such as The Office, which styles itself like a reality program. Furthermore, some images and pieces of culture retain enough meaning that they can easily be turned into a "subversive" mode. How is this possible unless there remains enough relationship and connection to areas outside of simulation?

Perhaps Baudrillard could argue that these acts of resistance are simply wheels within wheels. The evidence we see of Debord's dialectic is simply the dramatic narrative of the simulation we know. With this interpretation, the hyperreal can retain the dramatic elements and themes of an earlier time, even though this is now unhinged from meaning. However, this solipsistic position ignores much evidence from contemporary culture.

For example, we can see the dynamic of Debord's detournement and recuperation at work in several areas of contemporary, popular culture. Consider these recent manifestations of cultural recuperation: Motorcycles and motorcycle gang style- now co-opted into brand named superstores; punk rock and punk rock music- co-opted in the 1990's through grunge and alternative labels; or Goth subculture- co-opted both in popular television and movies and mainstream cosmetics that now feature Goth style colors in lipstick etc. Thus Debord's dynamic of detournement and recuperation seems to still be going strong.

Two intertwining poles of agency explain this dynamic’s motive force. The first pole (or it could be the second) of this dynamo are strategic, market calculations (recuperation revives failing street cred and hence sales). The second pole (though we might prefer that it be the first), are artistic imperatives (detournement carves out a space for creativity and, hence, originality). Yet, where is such agency to be found in Baudrillard's view?

In Baudrillard's broader work the simulacra he describes appear to feed off of each other. Yet this view seems sorely lacking in human agency. In a classic, broad reflection on perception and memory Bergson states, "The function of the body is not to store up recollections, but simply to choose, in order to bring back to consciousness, by the real efficacy thus conferred on it, the useful memory, that which may complete and illuminate the present situation with a view to ultimate action" (Bergson, 1991:179). Indeed, if the goal of an actor within Debord's dialectic is action, then she chooses some images and symbols with purpose. This dimension of strategy and tactics is missing from Baudrillard's analysis because it is, again to him, the wrong perspective. In contrast, detournement is at its core for Debord, a tool or tactic of class struggle and for defeating the remains of modernism in the arts. Such a program or cause is obsolete to Baudrillard given his view of our contemporary situation.

Another way to pose this difference between the two thinkers is to compare Debord's idea of the "spectacle" to Baudrillard's idea of "the system of objects". The chapter on advertising in Baudrillard's The System of Objects, brings out an important distinction between Baudrillard and Debord (Baudrillard, [1968] 1996:164-196). The discussion develops into an exploration of the mass psychology of advertising. Baudrillard argues that the rational claims made in advertising are not really believed by any of us. Instead, they provide a rationalization for purchases that we desire due to non-rational motivations. Baudrillard sees advertising as a surface phenomenon of the system of objects that we live within. The key difference between Baudrillard's description of this vast economic, political, and ideological system of consumption from Debord turns upon agency.

Debord still sees the spectacle as a force that can be countered with tactics such as detournement. In contrast, Baudrillard sees the system of objects as a more pervasive whole into which we are psychologically integrated. The idea of individual agency leading to some sort of resistance begins to look in Baudrillard's conception like the rebelliousness of a child, rather than the acts of Debord's class conflict.

So, where has this discussion taken us in thinking about politics and the simulation of politics? Debord and Wolman argue under the second law of detournement that it indeed requires a context but that this is, "only a particular case of a general law that governs not only detournement but also any other form of action in the world. The idea of pure absolute expression is dead" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). Thus, for Debord this context can be as mythical, metaphysical, or ideological as its audience is capable of comprehending.

Signs and simulacra in such a context suggest the stage of “sorcery” within Baudrillard's precession of simulacra. Could this be a good way of thinking about contemporary politics as a closed system of obscurantist meanings? From this perspective, detournement could still be alive in pockets of the hyperreal where individuals still participate within a bounded envelope of ideology. Within this context signs can profoundly refer to other signs for the initiated.

On the other hand, how believable is the idea that contemporary politics is an obscurantist system for the initiated, since politics involves mass behavior? Can such a view explain the agency and motivation we still encounter among political entrepreneurs that emerge from the grassroots? How can we explain the efforts at detournement we still see in society from below, as well as successful examples of recuperation?

III. Baudrillard, Debord, and Nostalgia

A possible path of reconciliation between these two positions is to consider Baudrillard's discussion of nostalgia. Baudrillard discusses in several of his later writings the prevalence for nostalgia in contemporary culture. Furthermore, our recent visions of the future seem to be ones where individuals are looking back upon us. The most obvious versions of this nostalgia for Baudrillard are books and films where, in a post apocalyptic setting; the survivors walk around the debris of our contemporary world.

In this sense there is a context in Baudrillard when he examines contemporary ideas of the future. The odd nostalgia he describes comes from us, human agents, trying to imagine the outcome of our contemporary actions. From this perspective, our unease is not due to the style or practice of contemporary politics, but to an underlying intuition about the failure of politics. Contemporary humanity faces the possibility of catastrophic risk. The shadow of ecological disaster is especially present in the minds of most of us.

Nostalgia then is something we feel for what politics was. Perhaps detournement continues to work because many of us long for modern (as opposed to contemporary) politics with its clarity of class conflict and ideologies that revolved around the role of the free market. Thus, we still respond to detournement actions that reference this earlier context. Furthermore, many of us prefer to still practice and participate in politics bounded by this context.

Yet, we suspect that this is simulation, not because it is "unreal" but because politics in this sense does not address the most urgent issues that should be political. Instead, with our politics locked into this modern context, the urgent issues of climate change, pollution, technological risk, and mass scale terrorism become topics for culture. Thus, we see the nostalgia for the "society that was", our current one, in literature and film with post apocalyptic themes.

Nostalgia is also a defense or a coping mechanism. What agency do any of us possess within our contemporary context? Because we sense the futility of politics, as we know it within this contemporary setting, we retreat to behaving as if the old context, with its familiar categories and practices, still exists. Because we behave this way, it does continue to exist but at a cost. We soldier on within a modern politics that is increasingly detached from the constraints (ecological, economic, and biological) of our existence. This closed system of modern politics goes on in a ritualistic fashion, despite our growing frustration, and awareness, of its inability to address our common problems.

Recent commentary that criticizes the whole idea of detournement and Baudrillard’s analysis reflects this desire for politics as it was. In their book, Nation of Rebels, Heath and Potter argue that Baudrillard and Debord have created a closed ideology (Heath and Potter, 2004). From this critical perspective, they argue that there is no system performing recuperation. Instead, by collapsing the categories of the political and the cultural, many on the left have fallen into a bottomless trap. They continue to try and create a counterculture that simply sells more lifestyle product, while failing to attend to “real” politics. Real politics being the incremental policy changes that create results as in the past.

Is this a devastating critique? Or is this nostalgia for the politics that was? The examples Heath and Potter give of positive change, the American Civil Rights Movement, the construction of the welfare state, seem like a museum to us now. Is the context for such political activity still with us? Do we live in an era capable of producing such outcomes?

Instead, politics in this sort of analysis begins to resemble religion in that we appeal to it and diligently perform our duties waiting for an intervention that does not come. Have we not performed our roles earnestly enough? Are we neglecting the rites of our fathers? Do we need to switch to another denomination? Should we blame the clergy? And of course some of us begin to have our doubts that any of it matters.

From this perspective, the post apocalyptic nostalgia so prevalent in contemporary culture voices our lurking fears. In these movies and books, our lurking suspicion that contemporary politics fails to address the "real problem" is realized. This is also a reconciliation of Baudrillard and Debord. Detournement still works because we can access this past context. Indeed, we continue to blindly insist that this past social context is still our contemporary home. When our contemporary attempts at politics flounder, because they must confront a very different world today, we try to evaluate their efficacy with this rubric from the past. Why are our governments unable to address the looming ecological crisis? Why don’t our political parties provide us with a range of public policies to choose from?

What do these observations mean for thinking about politics? If Baudrillard and Debord are both accurate in their descriptions, then we seem to be in a moment of political stagnation. The tactics of Debord's detournement remain relevant because we continue to look backward to what politics were. These tactics are successful on one larger point, they temporarily expose our contemporary politics as a simulation of the modern form of politics that was. In this sense, practicing Debord's detournement is a useful activity, but only a first step leading to our contemporary time's pervasive nostalgia. The next step, taking Baudrillard's diagnosis seriously, and developing new forms of politics for our contemporary situation, is a greater challenge (see also Lindsey 2007).

#### This is a question of priorities---their reliance on the state actively promotes racist domestic warfare and the prison industrial complex---prefer the alt which allows for more creative, dynamic forms of activism AGAINST THE STATE---the pedagogical nature of the activity matters

Rodriguez 8 (Dylan, Associate Professor at Un iversity of Califo r n i a Riverside, Warfare and the Terms of Engagement, libcom.org/files/Critical Resistance - Abolition Now! Ten Years of Strategy and Struggle against the Prison Industrial Complex.pdf

This introductory litany of dread reminds us that domestic warfare is both the common language and intensely materialized modality of the US state. While this form of legitimated state violence certainly predates Reagan's "war on drugs" and his/its inheritors, the scope and depth of domestic warmaking seems to be mount­ ing with a peculiar urgency in our historical moment. To take former NYPD and current LAPD Chief William Bratton on the strength of his own words, the pri­ mary work of the police is to engage aggressively in "the internal war on terrorism," which in these times entails everything from record-breaking expansions of urban police forces, to cross-party consensus in legislating state offensives against crimi- 92 nalized populations o f choice, and the reshuffling of administrative relationships between the militarized and juridical arms of local and federal government to fa­ cilitate the state's various localized "wars on gangs." It is in this context that we can urgently assume the political burden of critically assessing the work of progressive US based community and non-profit organizations, grassroots movements, and is­ sue-based campaigns: that is, if we are to take the state's own language of domestic warfare seriously, what do we make of the political, ideological, institutional, and financial relationships that progressive movements, campaigns, and organizations are creating in (uneasy) alliance with the state's vast architectures of war? Under what conditions and sets of assumptions are progressive activists, organizers, and scholars able to so militantly oppose the proliferation of American state violence in other parts of the world, while tolerating the everyday state violence of US policing, criminal law, and low-intensity genocide?

We are collectively witnessing, surviving, and working in a time of unprec­ edented state-organized human capture and state-produced physical/social/ psychic alienation, from the 2.5 million imprisoned by the domestic and global US prison industrial complex to the profound forms of informal apartheid and proto­ apartheid that are being instantiated in cities, suburbs, and rural areas all over the country. This condition presents a profound crisis-and political possibility-for people struggling against the white supremacist state, which continues to institution­ alize the social liquidation and physical evisceration of Black, brown, and aboriginal peoples nearby and far away. If we are to approach racism, neoliberalism, mili­ tarism/militarization, and US state hegemony and domination in a legitimately "global" way, it is nothing short of unconscionable to expend significant politi­ cal energy protesting American wars elsewhere (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) when there are overlapping, and no less profoundly oppressive, declarations of and mobilizations for war in our very own, most intimate and nearby geographies of "home."

This time of crisis and emergency necessitates a critical examination of the po­ litical and institutional logics that structure so much of the US progressive left, and particularly the "establishment" left that is tethered (for better and worse) to the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements. This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spec­ trum of government-proctored non-profit organizations. It i s i n the context o f the formation o f the NPIC a s a political power structure that I wish to address, with a less-than-subtle sense of alarm, a peculiar and dis­ turbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left (of which I too am a part, for better and worse): that is, the left's willingness to fundamentally tolerate-and accompanying unwillingness to abolish-the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence "normal" manifestations within the domestic "homeland" of the Homeland Security state. Behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist crimi­ nalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of Black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building proj ect. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, so­ cial and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the US) does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. Our non-profit left, in particular, seems content to en­ bdgt ill Jesperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars.

Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politi­ cally normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such "classical" structures of domi­ nance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises o f this condition o f domestic warfare i n favor o f short-term, "winnable" policy reforms? (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tol­ erate a "progressive" political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of "criminality" in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of "Three Strikes" laws?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state's terms of en­ gagement (that is, warfare)? This radical accountability reflects a variation on anti­ colonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon's memorable statement to his own peers, comrades, and nemeses:

Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opac­ ity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness.

Lest we fall victim to a certain political nostalgia that is often induced by such illuminating Fanonist exhortations, we ought to clarify the premises of the social "mission" that our generation of US based progressive organizing has undertaken. In the vicinity of the constantly retrenching social welfare apparatuses of the US state, much of the most urgent and immediate work of community-based or­ ganizing has revolved around service provision. Importantly, this pragmatic focus also builds a certain progressive ethic of voluntarism that constructs the model ac­ tivist as a variation on older liberal notions of the "good citizen." Following Fanon, the question is whether and how this mission ought to be fulfilled or betrayed. I believe that to respond to this political problem requires an analysis and conceptu­ alization of "the state" that is far more complex and laborious than we usually allow in our ordinary rush of obligations to build campaigns, organize communities, and write grant proposals. In fact, I think one pragmatic step toward an abolitionist politics involves the development of grassroots pedagogies (such as reading groups, in-home workshops, inter-organization and inter-movement critical dialogues) that will compel us to teach ourselves about the different ways that the state works in the context of domestic warfare, so that we no longer treat it simplistically. We require, in other words, a scholarly activist framework to understand that the state can and must be radically confronted on multiple fronts by an abolition ist politics.

In so many ways, the US progressive/left establishment is filling the void created by what Ruthie Gilmore has called the violent "abandonments" of the state, which forfeits and implodes its own social welfare capacities (which were already insuf­ ficient at best) while transforming and (productively) exploding its domestic war­ making functionalities (guided by a " frightening willingness to engage in human sacrifice"). Yet, at the same time that the state has been openly galvanizing itself to declare and wage violent struggle against strategically targeted local populations, the establishment left remains relatively unwilling and therefore institutionally un­ able to address the questions of social survival, grassroots mobilization, radical so­ cial justice, and social transformation on the concrete and everyday terms of the very domestic wares) that the state has so openly and repeatedly declared as the premises of its own coherence.

P I T FA L L S O F T H E P E DAG O G I CA L STATE

We can broadly understand that "the state" is in many ways a conceptual term that refers to a mind-boggling array of geographic, political, and institutional relations of power and domination. It is, in that sense, a term of abstraction: certainly the state is "real," but it is so massive and institutionally stretched that it simply can­ not be understood and "seen" in its totality. The way we come to comprehend the state's realness-or differently put, the way the state makes itself comprehensible, intelligible, and materially identifiable to ordinary people-is through its own self­ narrations and institutional mobilizations.

Consider the narrative and institutional dimensions of the "war on drugs," for nample. New Y ork City mayor Edward Koch, in a gesture of masculine challenge to the Reagan-era Feds, offers a prime example of such a narration in a 1986 op-ed piece published on the widely-read pages of The New York Times: I propose the following steps as a coordinated Federal response to [the war on drugs]: Use the full resources of the military for drug interdiction. The Posse Comitatus doctrine, which restricts participation of the military in civilian law enforce­ ment, must be modified so that the military can be used for narcotics control . . . Enact a Federal death penalty for drug wholesalers. Life sentences, harsh fines, forfeitures of assets, billions spent on education and therapy all have failed to deter the drug wholesaler. The death penalty would. Capital punishment is an extraordinary remedy, but we are facing an extraordinary peril . . . Designate United States narcotics prisons. The Bureau of Prisons should des­ ignate separate facilities for drug offenders. Segregating such prisoners from others, preferably i n remote locations such a s the Yukon or desert areas, might motivate drug offenders to abandon their trade. Enhance the Federal agencies combating the drug problem. The Attorney Gen­ eral should greatly increase the number of drug enforcement agents in New York and other cities. He should direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to devote substantial manpower against the cocaine trade and should see to it that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is capable of detecting and deporting aliens convicted of drug crimes in far better numbers than it now does. Enact the state and local narcotics control assistance act of 1986. This bill provides $750 million annually for five years to assist state and local jurisdictions increase their capacities for enforcement, corrections, education and prosecution.

These proposals offer no certainty for success in the fight against drugs, of course. If we are to succeed, however, it is essential that we persuade the Federal Government to recognize its responsibility to lead the way. Edward Koch's manifesto reflects an important dimension of the broader in­ stitutional, cultural, and political activities that build the state as a mechanism of self-legitimating violence: the state (here momentarily manifest in the person of the New York City Mayor) constantly tells stories about itself, facilitated by a politi­ cally willing and accomplice corporate media.

This storytelling-which through repetition and saturation assembles the pop­ ular "common sense" of domestic warfare-is inseparable from the on-the-ground shifting, rearranging, and recommitting of resources and institutional power that we witness in the everyday mobilizations of a state waging intense, localized, mili­ tarized struggle against its declared internal enemies. Consider, for example, how pronouncements like those of Koch, Reagan, and Bratton seem to always be ac­ companied by the operational innovation of different varieties of covert ops, urban guerilla war, and counterintelligence warfare that specifically emerge through the state's declared domestic wars on crime/drugs/gangs/etc. Hence, it is no coincidence that Mayor Koch's editorial makes the stunning appeal to withdraw ("modify") the Posse Comitatus principle, to allow the Federal government's formal mobilization of its global war apparatus for battle in the homeland neighborhoods of the war on drugs. To reference our example even more closely, we can begin to see how the ramped-up policing and massive imprisonment of Black and Latino youth in Koch's 1980s New York were enabled and normalized by his and others' attempts to story tell the legal empowerment and cultural valorization of the police, such that the nuts-and-bolts operation of the prison industrial complex was lubricated by the multiple moral parables of domestic warfare.

This process of producing the state as an active, tangible, and identifiable structure of power and dominance, through the work of self-narration and con­ crete mobilizations of institutional capacity, is what some scholars call "statecraft." Generally, the state materializes and becomes comprehensible to us through these definitive moments of crafting: that is, we come to identify the state as a series of active political and institutional projects. So, if the state's self-narration inundates us with depictions of its policing and juridical arms as the righteously punitive and justifiably violent front lines of an overlapping series of comprehensive, militarized, and culturally valorized domestic wars-for my generation, the "war on drugs," the generation prior, the "war on crime," and the current generation, localized "wars on gangs" and their planetary rearticulation in the "war on terror"-then it is the ma­ terial processes of war, from the writing of public policy to the hyper-weaponiza­ tion of the police, that commonly represents the existence of the state as we come to normally "know" it.

Given that domestic warfare composes both the common narrative language and concrete material production of the state, the question remains as to why the establishment left has not confronted this statecraft with the degree of absolute emergency that the condition implies (war!). Perhaps it is because we are under­ estimating the skill and reach of the state as a pedagogical (teaching) apparatus, replete with room for contradiction and relatively sanctioned spaces for " dissent" and counter-state organizing. Italian political prisoner Antonio Gramsci's thoughts on the formation of the contemporary pedagogical state are instructive here: The State does have and request consent, but it also "educates" this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class.

Although Gramsci was writing these words in the early 1900s, he had already iden­ tified the institutional symbiosis that would eventually produce the non-profit in­ dustrial complex. The historical record of the last three decades shows that liberal foundations such as the Ford, Mellon, Rockefeller, Soros and other financial entities have become politically central to "the private initiative of the ruling class" and have in fact funded a breath-taking number of organizations, grassroots campaigns, and progressive political interests. The questions I wish to insert here, however, are whether the financially enabling gestures of foundations also 1) exert a politically disciplinary or repressive force on contemporary social movements and community based organizations, while 2) nurturing an ideological and structural allegiance to the state that preempts a more creative, radical, abolitionist politics.

Several social movement scholars have argued that the "channeling mecha­ nisms" of the non-profit industrial complex "may now far outweigh the effect of direct social control by states in explaining the . . . orthodox tactics, and moderate goals of much collective action in modern America." The non-profit apparatus and its symbiotic relationship to the state amount to a sophisticated technology of po­ litical repression and social control, accompanying and facilitating the ideological and institutional mobilizations of a domestic war waging state. Avowedly pro­ gressive, radical, leftist, and even some misnamed "revolutionary" groups find it opportune to assimilate into this state-sanctioned organizational paradigm, as it simultaneously allows them to establish a relatively stable financial and operational infrastructure while avoiding the transience, messiness, and possible legal compli­ cation of working under decentralized, informal, or even "underground" auspices. Thus, the aforementioned authors suggest that the emergence of the state-proc­ tored non-profit industry "suggests a historical movement away from direct, crud­ er forms [of state repression], toward more subtle forms of state social control of social movements."

The regularity with which progressive organizations immediately forfeit the crucial political and conceptual possibilities of abolishing domestic warfare is a direct reflection of the extent to which domestic war has been fashioned into the everyday, "normal" reality of the state. By extension, the non-profit industrial complex, which is fundamentally guided by the logic of being state-sanctioned (and often state-funded), also reflects this common reality: the operative assumptions of domestic warfare are taken for granted because they form and inform the popu­ lar consensus.

Effectively contradicting, decentering, and transforming the popular consensus (for example, destabiliZing assertive assumptions common to progressive move­ ments and organizations such as "we have to control/get rid of gangs," "we need prisons," or "we want better police") is, in this context, dangerously difficult work. Although, the truth of the matter is that the establishment US left, in ways both spoken and presumed, may actually agree with the political, moral, and ideological premises of domestic warfare. Leaders as well as rank-and-file members in avowedly progressive organizations can and must reflect on how they might actually be supporting and reproducing existing forms of racism, white supremacy, state violence, and domestic warfare in the process of throwing their resources behind what they perceive as "winnable victories," in the lexicon of venerable community organizer Saul Alinsky. Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One po­ litical move long overdue is toward grassroots pedagogies of radical dis-identification with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive identification with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider "insurgency" as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive ma­ neuvering of "resistance"). Reading a few a few lines down from our first invoking of Fanon's call to collective, liberatory action is clarifying here: "For us who are de­ termined to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to authorize every revolt, every desperate act, and every attack aborted or drowned in blood." While there are rare groups in existence that offer this kind of nourishing polit­ ical space (from the L.A.-based Youth Justice Coalition to the national organization INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence), they are often forced to expend far too much energy challenging both the parochialisms of the hegemonic non-profit apparatus and the sometimes narrow politics of the progressive US left.

I have become somewhat obsessed with amplifying the need for a dramatic, even spectacular political shift that pushes against and reaches beyond the implicit pro­ state politics of left progressivism. Most importantly, I am convinced that the aboli­ tion ot domestic warfare, not unlike precedent (and ongoing) struggles to abolish colonialism, slavery, and programmatic genocide, necessitates a rigorous theoreti­ cal and pragmatic approach to a counter- and anti-state radicalism that attempts to fracture the foundations of the existing US social form-because after all, there is truly nothing to be redeemed of a society produced through such terror-inspiring structures of dominance. lhis political shift requires a sustained labor of radical vision, and in the most crucial ways is actually anchored to "progressive" notions of life, freedom, community, and collective/personal security (including safety from racist policing/criminalization and the most localized brutalities of neoliberal or global capitalism).

Arguably, it is precisely the creative and pragmatic work of political fantasy/ political vision/political imagination that is the most underdeveloped dimension of the US establishment left's organizational modus operandi and public discourse. While a full discussion is best left for another essay, we might consider the post- 1960s history of the reactionary, neoconservative, and Christian fundamentalist US right, which has fully and eagerly engaged in these political labors of fantasy/vi-sionlimagination, and has seen the desires of their wildest dreams met o r exceeded in their struggles for political and cultural hegemony. It might be useful to begin by thinking of ourselves as existing in a relationship of deep historical obligation to the long and recent, faraway and nearby historical legacies of radical, revolutionary, and liberationist struggles that have made the abolition of oppressive violence their most immediate and fundamental political desire.

## Alt

Lundberg 10 (Christian O, Master of the House of Theory, Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p306-313)

Because they are also citizens, students will inevitably be put in the position of arguing in public about one or more of these questions, and to be sure, we are not dealing with very many of these disputes productively in the public sphere as currently constituted. As one of the few common touchstone expe- riences that profoundly influences the views and practices of democratic life together or future leaders, corporate movers and shakers, media moguls, teach- ers, and everyday citizens, colleges and universities should take a more active role in equipping citizens with the tools to productively manage the rough and tumble of democratic life. Universities inculcate practices of citizenship that students carry over into public life, whether such practices are inculcated with care, intentionality, and deliberation or by simple inattention. Thus, those de- tractors who reject debate as engendering unhealthy democratic antagonism are on shaky argumentative ground on two separate accounts: even if debate practices engender a degree of antagonism, they are certainly better than the prevailing modes of public discourse; and, beyond the speculations of those who are primarily arguing against a caricature of debate, the best empirical studies of actual debate pedagogy indicate that debate inculcates precisely the kind of argumentative capacities that can correct for the antagonistic failings of democratic deliberation.

Debate provides a critical and perhaps unparalleled tool for building democratic capacities because it creates incentives to listen to opposing arguments, and, more important, to think them through on their own terms, if only, at first, for the sake of strategic due diligence. Kennedy’s compilation of studies substanti- ates the claim that debate creates better listening skills, and further, that the empirical effect of increased listening in the context of debate is a significantly increased possibility for opinion change compared to other pedagogical strate- gies (Kennedy 2007, 184, 185). Kennedy’s study is worth quoting at length here because of the strength and breadth of empirical evidence that she marshals:

opponents believe that participation in a debate merely reinforces a student’s existing beliefs rather than promoting an objective analysis of an issue. However, Simonneaux (2001) reports that in all of his studies, the only time the students in his biotechnology classes . . . have changed their opinions has been when they participated in a role play or debate. In Budesheim and Lundquist’s (2000) research study of 72 students in three psychology courses at Creighton University, the students who defended a position they already supported almost always maintained their original viewpoint, whereas the students who argued a position inconsistent with their initial opinion were more likely to change their opinion. The response of the audience proved to be unpredictable, as only 52% maintained their original positions. Green and Klug (1990) reported similar results in that the sociology students who defended their initial viewpoint did not change their view, whereas those who were initially neutral or initially opposed the view they defended often changed their view in support of the side they de- bated. Johnson and Johnson (1985) found that 11 and 12 year old students who studied controversial issues independently were less likely to change their opinions than those who engaged in debate with others. (Kennedy 2007, 186)

This potential for opinion change, especially when compared to other pedagogi- cal methods, makes it difficult to sustain the thesis that debate engenders inflex- ible antagonism. One explanation for these results is found in Goodwin’s study, which validates the idea that debate creates a framework for cooperative group learning around contested issues. Goodwin concludes that her “results point to the value of debate-across-the-curriculum for promoting small group commu- nication and for fostering divergent perspectives on course topics” (Goodwin 2003, 157). In her accounting, practice in structured debate is ultimately the core determinant of whether students learn to see debate as cooperative democratic problem solving, ultimately subsuming debate’s antagonistic impulses within a broader sense of openness to opposing viewpoints, or whether students will parrot already culturally available and, frankly, bad models of debate that circulate in mass media.

But the ideological openness and opinion flexibility produced by debate are not simply reducible to listening or to better group-communication processes, though these are significant benefits in and of themselves. One of the primary reasons why debate processes promote managed antagonism and a cooperatively open-minded ethos for democratic education is debate’s unique capacity to in- culcate argumentatively based role-playing. Ostensibly, one of the significant drivers of the intense antagonistic impasses in contemporary American public deliberation is that often times such impasses are underwritten by a fundamen- tal inattention to the best merits of the other side of a democratic dispute’s arguments and motivations. Mitchell (2000) argues that debate provides a pitch-perfect antidote to this problem by inviting students to inhabit the argu- mentative frame of those with whom they might not agree. The result of this practice is that students are more able to productively interrogate their preexist- ing opinions in the light of public argument, and simultaneously are called to engage in an evaluative reformation of their stances on the issue at hand. Cumulatively, the incentives that in-class debate creates for evaluating all sides of an issue, strategic innovation in addressing the resolution, openness to dif- fering points of view, listening, opinion change, and role-playing make debate a democratic technology par excellence. Debate is a deliberative technology that extends democratic discourse by providing capacity for better-informed and more clearly articulated positions on contested issues, while simultaneously (and even perhaps paradoxically) producing a citizen who is more likely to lis- ten to, engage, and even be changed by the opinions of others. The crucial ques- tion here is not whether the debate process has drawbacks. Rather, the crucial question is whether or not debate is the best alternative among the available alternatives for democratic discourse. Democratic discourse is, by its nature, contingent, imperfect, and only undertaken under conditions where compet- ing interests are at stake and where there is no unassailable normative claim to decide a dispute. In this light, the paradoxical ability of debate to both clarify and strengthen convictions while cultivating openness to a diversity of opinions and social positions makes it perhaps the best alternative among necessarily imperfect modes of democratic talk.

While these arguments address the first critique of debate, they are also the kinds of claims that underwrite much of the force of Greene and Hicks’s critique of debate as a cultural technology. I take Greene and Hicks as exemplars of the idea that debate creates an insular conception of democracy, in part because of their recent reception by the debate community, but more specifically because Greene and Hicks’s argument taps into a significant cultural meme regarding debate—that debate creates an arrogance regarding proper analytical and dem- ocratic practice that works at cross-purposes to valuing other modes of delibera- tion. It is worth noting that Greene and Hicks are not arguing against debate per se, but rather against the cultural appropriations of debate, and that despite their critique they have been supportive of debate as a pedagogical practice. The primary point of Greene and Hicks’s critique is that debate is a technology, that is, a habituated technique for organizing speech. In their reading, debate, as a technology of discourse, regulates not only what can be said in public, but how it will be said, and to what broader cultural and political effects this technique can be yoked. In this reading, debate as a technology is open to any number of cultural appropriations, which reaffirm the desirability of a mode of democratic deliberation in ways that may be both productive and destructive. In this light, it is possible to say that debate has benefits for the individual student partici- pants, but also that the larger cultural implications of debate are that it has too often served as a mode of legitimating an American democratic exceptionalism at the expense of other forms of political speech. One of the implications of marking debate as a cultural technology, and more specifically as a habituated technique for discourse, is that the character of debate is not given in advance, but is open to constant rearticulation—as a technology debate can be articu- lated to certain undesirable ends, but it is also amenable to being articulated differently. This, in fact, is one of the great virtues of debate compared to other means of dialogue: that it not only invites a constant reinvention but also creates strategic incentives for such reinvention.

Debate shares this commitment to reinvention with democracy: one of the great virtues of democracy, noted in Greek antiquity and reiterated by modern-day theorists from John Dewey to Jacques Derrida, is that democracy is amenable to critique, reformulation, and improvement. Dewey captures this notion in the idea of “creative intelligence,” which holds that the very contingent conditions that invite democratic life together in the first place also allow for the cre- ative and deliberative reformulation of democracy in response to its challenges (Dewey and Moore 2007). Derrida (2001) has argued similarly that democracy’s best feature is that it is both revisable and perfectible. The implication of de- mocracy’s revisability and perfectibility extends both backward into an account of democracy’s founding conditions and forward to its ideal future: to a “de- mocracy yet to come” (Derrida 2001). Perfectibility and revisability imply that the democracy we have now is neither perfect, complete, nor guaranteed in advance. At the same time, perfectibility and revisability imply that whatever democracy’s failings, the founding condition of democracy also invites the pos- sibility that democracy will exceed its current iterations and be made anew, into something that is better. As democratic technology and technique, debate builds a structural commitment to perfectibility and revisability into democratic discourse, by suggesting that current conditions of democratic life be open to critical analysis and that our common democratic life might be lived differently. Because debate practice highlights both the revisability and perfectibility of democratic life, on balance, the best answer to the drawbacks of debate’s current cultural articulations is, to put it bluntly, more debate.

Specifically, by the very practice of holding critical questions up for public con- test, debate pedagogy inculcates an ethos that sees democracy as not already here, but as something in the making, so much so that a commitment to debate embodies both the strongest critique of and best hope for perfecting democratic politics—debate practices, by their nature, relentlessly rearticulate democracy. More pointedly for Greene and Hicks’s critique, the best way out of a broader sense of democratic insularity lies in turning debate toward the presuppositions of American exceptionalism, a move present in the most simple act of debate: that is, in pointing out that there is something flawed in the status quo or in our conventional approaches to fixing it. Debate practice contains within itself the conditions for exceeding the current articulation of democracy and simultane- ously cultivates capacities that provide concrete political hope that we might realize a democracy that is different from the one we have now. The alternative, to give up on debate, leaves not only the insularity of debate’s articulation to democracy intact, but more important, leaves the whole edifice of American exceptionalism, which is rooted deeply at many sites beyond debate, fundamen- tally untroubled.

The final critique of debate pedagogy that I address is that debate practice pro- motes a naive conception of the speaking citizen that is inappropriate to our current democratic context. This critique of debate, while useful in highlighting the changing conditions of governance that implicate all of us, fails on two ac- counts. First, even though the citizen speaking in public may not hold the same sway it once did (if it ever did), speech does make a difference in a number of The Allred InITIATIve And debATe Across The currIculum 311 democratic processes: political speech influences how people vote and to whom they contribute money, and it makes a significant difference at a number of sites in the administrative apparatuses of modern government (for instance in public notice and comment practices). More important, even if the romantic vision of the individual citizen’s speech changing the course of democratic life is a bit overblown in our context, political speech makes an important difference in noninstitutional practices of political socialization: political speech not only influences who we will vote for but also sets the bar for what we will put up with, profoundly influences our views regarding the legitimacy of public policies, and determines the range of opinions to which we are exposed. Thus, even if debate practices do not directly access the levers of power, they might play a significant role in the production and reformulation of our political culture.

## At perm

#### Role-playing causes passivity, tyranny and denies value to life

Antonio ‘95 (Robert, University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43, AM)\*We don’t endorse gendered language

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors**-"The role has actually become the character." **This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity.** The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). **Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra.** One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment **paves the way for a new type of tyrant** (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

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## Uniqueness

#### Shutdown won’t happen, but there’s still GOP fights

Blake 9/22 **–** Staff writers for the Washington Post (Sen. Mike Lee – there will be no shutdown, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/22/sen-mike-lee-there-will-be-no-shutdown/)

Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), one of the leaders of the Defund Obamacare effort, assured Sunday that the effort will not lead to a government shutdown.¶ Asked point-blank about a potential shutdown, Lee said -- as he has said before -- that it won't come to that.¶ "No. We all know that the government is going to be funded. The questions is whether it will be funded with Obamacare or without," Lee said on NBC's "Meet the Press."¶ Lee and other supporters of the Defund Obamacare movement have said they will not support a budget that would fund the president's signature health care law. If Republicans stand by that pledge and won't support a budget that funds Obamacare -- something Democrats are insisting on -- it seems increasingly possible that Congress won't pass a budget by the deadline at the end of the month.

## Link

#### Plan is unpopular—environment and farmers

Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative ’11 [4-17-11, Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative, “Is NAFTA Good for Mexico and the United States?,” http://danielsethics.mgt.unm.edu/pdf/NAFTA%20DI.pdf, accessed 7-5-13]

The early 1990s was a favorable time for trade unions, seeing some of the most powerful nations in the world joining forces: The European Union (EU) and South America’s Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) were formed in 1992 and 1991, respectively. The framework for what would later become NAFTA was laid in 1988, when discussions began concerning a trade union between the United States and Canada. This measure was deeply unpopular with many constituents in Canada and Mexico, who feared that NAFTA would hurt many groups, including small farmers, and would lead to environmental degradation. Before President Clinton sent the bill to the House of Representatives, he added clauses protecting American workers as well as environmental regulations. Still, many opponents of NAFTA in all participating countries maintain that the agreement does not do enough to protect workers, and that environmental regulations are difficult to enforce internationally.

#### Plan is seen as a modification to NAFTA—drains PC, direct trade-off with Obama’s priorities

Magnus ‘9 John R. Magnus, trade lawyer in Washington, DC, is President of TradeWins LLC and Of Counsel

at Miller & Chevalier Chartered, ‘9

2. Emphasis: How much relative emphasis will the new government place on “reforming” existing trade pacts, as opposed to pursuing or implementing new ones? Existing pacts provide net economic benefits (although modest in some cases) to the United States. Tweaking them to provide even more net benefits is possible in theory, but would be difficult both technically and politically, and may not be the canniest use of resources in terms of using trade policy to help make America’s economy hum again. 3. Votes: Will the new government allow any major trade-liberalizing items to come to a vote in the first two years? Conventional wisdom holds that trade votes are bad for the Democratic party -- they split the caucus, demoralize stakeholders, and generally spell trouble for the party’s political majority. Many regard allowing trade initiatives to reach the front of the legislative queue as a blunder of the early Clinton administration. A precious period of unified government was squandered when it could, the argument goes, have been used to enact important Democratic priorities. And then it might have lasted longer -- the 1994 Republican takeover could have been averted! Although questionable in several particulars, this narrative is present in the minds of many Democrats in and out of government today, and they are determined to manage the new period of unified government differently. There will be a strong temptation to use President Obama’s political capital exclusively for initiatives favored by a strong majority of Democrats, to keep trade-liberalizing measures (and related items like Trade Promotion Authority) off the voting agenda for months or even years, and to limit any congressional trade votes to matters like adjustment assistance and enforcement. But, of course, foreign policy concerns, and business community desires, will pull in the opposite direction.

## Trading life

#### Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3 Frederick—cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, *From Apocalypse To Way of Life,* pages 185-186

Looked at critically, then, crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a political liability almost as much as an asset. It calls up a fierce and effective opposition with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too vulnerable to refutation by events. It also exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “total solution” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “final solution.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit depoliticizes people, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need to delink from nature and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to further indifference to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “total solution.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode;** eco-authoritarianism was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”